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SAVING AND INVESTMENT IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
Recent trends, prospects and policy issues 
This issue of Supplement A describes and attempts to explain the sharp decline 
experienced by saving and investment ratios in the transition countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union since 1989. It also looks at the 
issue of whether transition countries ' external financing needs will exert additional 
pressures on international capital markets in the future. It is argued that, although 
external capital will continue to play an important role in the transition process, the 
future recovery of investment rates in these countries is likely to be financed mostly 
by an increase in domestic saving, particularly corporate saving. This is consistent 
with the high correlations between national saving and investment rates generally 
found by the empirical literature, and with the fact that the recent recovery of 
corporate investment in the most advanced Central European countries is being 
largely self-financed through an improvement in enterprise profitability. 
The Supplement concludes with some policy recommendations for increasing the 
level and improving the allocation of saving in transition countries. These 
recommendations include : pursuing policies conducive to a stable macroeconomic 
environment and sustainable growth; increasing public saving; reforming the 
pay-as-you-go public pension systems while developing complementary private 
schemes based on the principle of full funding; proceeding with the restructuring of 
the banking systems; and developing the capital markets. Transition countries 
should think twice before adopting any tax reform aimed at encouraging household 
saving. As the experience of other countries suggests, while the impact of tax 
incentives on household saving is at best moderate and of a medium-term nature, 
their fiscal costs can be important. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. Under the socialist system, the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
displayed very high saving and investment ratios by 
international standards. Since they began their 
pro-market reforms, however, practically all transi-
tion countries (TC) have suffered a sharp decline in 
their saving/GDP and investment/GDP ratios. In-
vestment ratios have fallen from an average of more 
than 32% in the period 1977-88 to an average of about 
20% in 1994. Saving ratios have fallen by even more, 
thus leading to a deterioration in the aggregate current 
account of the region. The average saving ratio declined 
from around 32% in 1977-88 to 17% of GDP in 1994, 
well below a world average of 21.4% of GDP. 
2. The collapse of saving ratios is explained by the de-
cline in enterprise and public saving. In many 
countries public saving has turned negative. The 
contraction of public saving has normally been trans-
lated into substantial increases of the public deficits, 
despite the fact that public investment has also fallen in 
most countries. This has been particularly true in Bul-
garia, Albania and the New Independent States. The 
only countries that have avoided this fiscal deteriora-
tion are the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Baltic 
states. 
3. By contrast, partial statistical information on 
household income and expenditure suggest that 
household saving ratios are recovering from their 
very depressed pre-transition levels. The end of the 
paternalistic protection provided by the socialist state 
against personal mishaps, the uncertainty associated 
with the transition process, increased income inequality 
and a growing choice of financial and real assets where 
households may place their savings are among the pos-
sible factors explaining the recovery of household sav-
ing ratios. 
4. The decline in investment/GDP ratios is explained 
by the reduction of corporate investment and, to a 
lesser extent, public investment. To the usual negative 
impact of recession on enterprise investment has been 
added the negative implications of transition itself (in-
creased economic and political uncertainty, "pre-pri-
vatization agony"). In spite of the important decline in 
public investment/GDP ratios, however, these ratios re-
main in TC on average at approximately the levels seen 
in industrial countries (about 3.7% of GDP in 1994). 
5. Saving in TC not only has fallen abruptly but is to a 
large extent allocated inefficiently. In a large number 
of countries the scarce pool of private saving is mostly 
absorbed by the state to finance its public investment 
and its dissaving, resulting in the crowding out of pri-
vate investment. Furthermore, the small part that is not 
absorbed by the state is often channeled by weak, non-
competitive and largely state-controlled banking sys-
tems to loss-making enterprises and sectors. 
6. In recent years both economic studies and state-
ments by policy-makers have warned about the risk 
that the combination of low saving ratios and huge 
investment needs in TC may significantly add to up-
ward pressures on global real interest rates in the 
coming years. This Supplement argues that this 
danger is probably overstated. First, the likely in-
crease in investment demand in TC has been exagger-
ated (many estimates have been based on unrealistic 
catching-up with the West scenarios and have tended to 
confuse investment needs with actual investment de-
mand). Second, there has been a failure to recognize the 
capacity of TC's domestic saving rates to recover as 
their economies strengthen and restructuring proceeds. 
7. While external capital is playing and will continue 
to play in the future an important role in the transi-
tion process, the experience of other countries (includ-
ing the high correlations between national saving and 
investment rates generally found by the empirical lit-
erature) suggests that the future recovery of invest-
ment ratios in TC is likely to be mostly financed by 
an increase in domestic saving, particularly corpor-
ate saving. This is also what the latest Commission ma-
croeconomic forecasts for the associated countries and 
the latest projections contained in the IMF World Econ-
omic Outlook imply. Moreover, it is consistent with the 
fact that the recent recovery of corporate investment in 
the most advanced Central European countries (Czech 
Republic, Poland and Hungary) has been largely self-
financed through an improvement in enterprise profit-
ability. 
8. The Supplement concludes with the following policy 
recommendations for increasing the level and improv-
ing the allocation of saving in TC: 
General policy measures: TC should pursue policies 
conducive to a stable macroeconomic framework and 
sustainable growth. Empirical evidence shows that 
high economic growth leads to higher national saving 
ratios, and that developing countries that managed to 
keep low rates of inflation and foreign debt have tended 
to display higher national saving ratios, to receive more 
foreign direct investment and to enjoy better access to 
the international capital markets. 
Monetary policy measures: By suring (in combination 
with interest rate liberalization) a sufficiently attractive 
real remuneration for depositors, monetary policy may 
also directly increase private saving and can prevent the 
channelling of domestic saving abroad or to informal, 
and less efficient, domestic financial markets. 
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Fiscal measures: Increasing public saving (particular­
ly if achieved through cuts in current expenditures 
rather than tax increases) is the safest and most direct 
way in which the authorities in TC can have a positive 
impact on aggregate saving. As the experience of other 
countries shows, governments in TC should be ex­
tremely careful with the short­term fiscal costs of any 
tax reform aimed at encouraging household saving, and 
should avoid granting tax incentives (interest deducti­
bility) for consumer borrowing (except perhaps in the 
case of house mortgages). Given the recent and ex­
pected increase in old­age dependency ratios, TC 
should reform and downsize their current, pay­as­you­
go public pension systems and develop complementary 
private schemes based on the principle of full funding. 
Financial sector measures: Recapitalizing and 
strengthening the balance­sheets of commercial banks 
and increasing competition among them would stimu­
late both saving and investment by allowing a reduction 
in their large lending­deposit spreads. Stronger, more 
efficient and less­state controlled banking sectors 
would also improve the allocation of saving among al­
ternative investment projects and borrowers. Over the 
medium run, this would tend to increase corporate sav­
ing by eliminating the implicit subsidization of loss­
making enterprises through the roll­over of non­per­
forming loans and by facilitating the emergence of 
high­profit enterprises in the new private sector. The 
development of capital markets can also have positive 
implications for the level of household saving and for 
the allocation of saving. 
I. SAVING AND INVESTMENT UNDER THE 
SOCIALIST SYSTEM 
Under the socialist system, national saving and investment 
were basically targeted by the government as part of the 
country's overall economic plan. Most saving took place 
within the government­enterprise sector, through direct 
and indirect taxation and retained earnings of enterprises. 
Household saving also contributed to national saving but 
that contribution was normally small1. The decision over 
how much of society's output should be consumed and 
how much should be saved and invested in order to increase 
future consumption was one of the most important deci­
sions made by central planners. 
By centrally setting both output prices and the costs of pro­
duction, the planners determined the profits of the state­
owned enterprises. The government also decided how 
much of these profits could be retained by the enterprises to 
self­finance their investment and how much would be 
transferred to the state (via taxes or profit remittances) to 
finance public consumption, direct investment by the state 
or capital grants from the state to other enterprises. The 
state budget thus played a central role also in the mobiliz­
ation of saving and its transformation into investment. 
By contrast, in market economies national saving is mostly 
the result of the individual and decentralized decisions of 
households and enterprises. The private sector generates 
1 Household saving in Hungary, for example, represented on average in the 
period 1985­89 less than 5% of GDP (see table 1). 
TABLE 1 : Saving and investment ratios : 
Albania 
Saving 
Government 
Non-government " ' 
Investment 
Government 
Non-government " ' 
Bulgaria 
Saving 
Government 
Non-government ' " 
Investment 
Government 
Non-government ( 1 ) 
Former CSFR 
Saving 
Government 
Non-government <" 
Investment 
Government 
Non-government M 
Czech Republic 
Saving 
Government 
Non-government " ' 
Investment 
Government 
Non-government ' " 
Slovak Republic 
Saving 
Government 
Non-government ' ' ' 
Investment 
Government 
Non-govemment ' " 
Hungary 
Saving 
Government 
Enterprises 
Households 
Investment 
Government ■ 
Enterprises 
Households 
Poland 
Saving 
Government 
Non-government <" 
Investment 
Government 
Non-government *" 
Romania 
Saving 
Government 
Non-government (' > 
Investment 
Government 
Non-government ' " 
Former Yugoslavia 
Saving 
Investment 
Weighted average "Central Europe" 
Saving 
Government 
Non-government *" 
Investment 
Government 
Non-government m 
' ' ' Obtained as a residual. 
"Central Europe" (in percent of G D P ) 
1985 
27.5 
-
-
30.4 
-
-
30.7 
-
-
31 
-
-
29.9 
-
-
27.5 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
22.7 
5.X 
11.8 
5.1 
25 
6.9 
13.7 
4.4 
26 
-
-
27.7 
-
-
37.3 
-
-
33 
-
-
42.5 
40.6 
30.1 
-
-
29.8 
-
-
1986 
29.9 
-
-
30.9 
-
-
32 
7.4 
24.6 
34.9 
10 
24.9 
29.8 
-
-
28.9 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
21.8 
4.9 
11.2 
5.7 
26.9 
6.5 
15.7 
4.8 
27.6 
-
-
28.9 
-
-
38.2 
-
-
34.4 
-
-
41.7 
39.8 
30.8 
-
-
31.3 
-
-
1987 
27.4 
-
-
28.4 
-
-
29.3 
7.9 
21.4 
32 
12 
20 
29.1 
-
-
27.8 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
23.3 
4.5 
14.4 
4.4 
26.7 
6 
16.5 
4.2 
27.9 
4.3 
23.6 
28.8 
5.1 
23.7 
36.2 
-
-
31.8 
-
-
40.7 
38.9 
30.2 
5.1 
25.1 
30.2 
6.7 
23.5 
'2) Data from other sources suggest that stock accumulation, and therefore total investment, is 
(3) Forecasts. 
Sources: IMF, World Bank and national statistics. 
1988 
24.9 
-
-
28.9 
-
-
30.5 
4.7 
25.8 
34.2 
S.l 
26.1 
29.5 
6.4 
23.1 
26.6 
8.6 
18 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
24 
7.5 
11.4 
5 
25 
6.2 
14.3 
4.9 
32.1 
2.8 
29.3 
32.6 
4.6 
28 
37.9 
-
-
28.4 
-
-
42.3 
38.2 
32.3 
4.7 
27.6 
30.9 
6.4 
24.5 
substatially 
1989 
27.5 
-
-
31.7 
-
-
27.1 
4.1 
23 
33.1 
6.9 
26.2 
29.5 
5.7 
23.8 
27.7 
6.2 
21.5 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
23.7 
5.2 
13.9 
4.6 
26.1 
5.9 
15.6 
5.2 
26 
-2.8 
28.8 
28.7 
4 
24.7 
31.3 
-
-
25.8 
-
-
40 
37.5 
28.7 
1.6 
27.2 
29.4 
5.3 
24.1 
overstated in 
1990 
19.7 
-
-
28.9 
-
-
23.5 
-5.6 
29.1 
28.9 
3.1 
25.8 
28 
6.6 
21.4 
30.7 
6.1 
24.6 
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
27.2 
5.1 
14 
S.l 
24 
3.6 
17.4 
4.5 
28.6 
3.4 
25.2 
27.5 
3.6 
23.9 
21.7 
8.6 
13.1 
30.2 
7.7 
22.5 
33.5 
35 
27.3 
3.8 
23.6 
29.0 
4.6 
24.4 
the Romanian. 
1991 
-13 
-27 
14 
6.1 
6 
0 
22.5 
-6.6 
29.1 
27.9 
2 
25.9 
29.6 
6.4 
23.2 
26.8 
5.6 
21.2 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
... 
-
18.1 
3.9 
1.5 
12.7 
20.8 
4.4 
12.4 
3.8 
17.3 
-5.1 
22.4 
19.9 
4.1 
15.8 
24.7 
3.6 
21.1 
28 
6 
22 
29.6 
30 
22.5 
-0.6 
23.1 
24.3 
4.4 
19.9 
1992 
-55 
-24 
-32 
5.1 
4 
1 
10.6 
-4.3 
14.9 
19.7 
2.7 
17 
23.7 
7.7 
16 
23.1 
6.5 
16.6 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
19.1 
1.6 
6.7 
10.8 
19.5 
6.3 
10.2 
3 
14.9 
-4.3 
19.1 
15.2 
3.7 
11.4 
22.9 
0.5 
22.4 
31.2 
5.8 
25.4 
-
-
17.5 
-0.4 
18.0 
20.2 
4.8 
15.4 
1993 
-18 
-12 
- 6 
14 
8 
6 
8.1 
-11.7 
19.8 
15.8 
1.9 
13.9 
-
-
-
-
-
-
19.2 
4.8 
14.4 
17.8 
4.2 
13.6 
18 
-3.3 
21.3 
21.9 
4.1 
17.7 
13.9 
-1.1 
9.9 
5.1 
23.1 
4.7 
15.7 
2.7 
13.8 
-0.6 
14.4 
16.4 
3.4 
13 
24.5 
4 
20.5 
29.3 
4.3 
25 
-
-
15.5 
-0.9 
16.4 
17.4 
3.4 
13.9 
1994(3) 
- 4 
-5 
1 
15 
8 
7 
11.2 
- 5 
16.2 
19.3 
1.7 
17.6 
-
-
-
-
-
-
21.8 
3.1 
18.7 
22.5 
4.9 
17.6 
22.3 
0.3 
20.7 
17.1 
4.2 
12.9 
13.7 
-3.9 
11.9 
5.7 
22.9 
4.1 
16.2 
2.6 
14.2 
-1.4 
15.6 
16.6 
3.2 
13.4 
23.5 
3.6 
19.9 
24.4 
5.7 
18.7 
-
-
16.6 
-0.7 
17.3 
17.1 
3.6 
13.6 
the bulk of national saving, with government saving nor-
mally being small (or often negative) and primarily moti-
vated by the desire to avoid excessive budget deficits. In 
capitalist economies a much greater proportion of national 
income is distributed to households and, therefore, a larger 
share of national saving is accumulated in the household 
sector. Most saving is intermediated by the financial sys-
tem, instead of by the state budget as it was the case in so-
cialist economies. 
As it is well known, the authorities' desire for a rapid rate of 
economic growth led centrally-planned economies to sus-
tain very high saving and investment rates by international 
standards2. Saving and investment in the countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are 
estimated to have been on average in the order of 32% of 
GDP in the period 1977-1988. This compares with a world 
average of about 24% of GDP and an average of 21.5 % in 
the industrial countries over the same period. Saving and 
investment rates in socialist countries substantially ex-
ceeded the world averages, reaching in some cases record 
levels of about 40% of GDP (see tables 1 and 2). 
TABLE 2 : Saving and investment ratios 
(in percent of GDP) 
Estonia 
Saving 
Government 
Non-government*2' 
Investment 
Government 
Non-government*2' 
Latvia 
Saving 
Government 
Non-government*2' 
Investment 
Government 
Non-government*2' 
Lithuania 
Saving 
Government 
Non-government*2' 
Investment 
Government 
Non-government*2' 
Russia 
Saving 
Government 
Non-government*2' 
Investment 
Government 
Non-government*2' 
Former Soviet Union 
Saving 
Investment 
Avg 
1980-89 
-
_ 
_ 
-
_ 
_ 
-
_ 
_ 
-
_ 
33.3 
32.3 
1990 
30.3 
35.1 
-
31.8 
35 
_ 
37.6 
7.4 
30.2 
38 
4 
34 
29.4 
30.2 
-
28.1 
29.8 
Former Soviet Union*1' 
1991 
22.3 
3.8 
18.5 
22.4 
3.1 
19.3 
33.1 
35 
-
34.6 
7.7 
26.9 
34.3 
2.8 
31.5 
39.8 
39.1 
-
34.4 
34.5 
1992 
26.4 
1.5 
24.9 
27.7 
1.3 
26.4 
26.8 
1.4 
25.4 
25.2 
1.5 
23.7 
25.5 
4.7 
20.8 
22.2 
2.6 
19.6 
30.1 
-16 
46.1 
35.4 
4.5 
30.9 
23.9 
29.2 
1993 
25.5 
1.8 
23.7 
26.2 
2.1 
24.1 
21.8 
2 
19.8 
13.4 
1.1 
12.3 
12.5 
4 
8.5 
15 
2.6 
12.4 
29.8 
-4.5 
34.3 
25.8 
4 
21.8 
25.4 
23.2 
1994 
20.8 
1.5 
19.3 
26.2 
2 
24.2 
15.7 
0.1 
15.6 
19.4 
2 
17.4 
12.9 
1.6 
11.3 
18 
3.4 
14.6 
18 
-5.1 
24.1 
19.2 
3.8 
16.3 
16.4 
19 
Í1' Tentative estimates. 
*2' Derived as a residual. 
Sources: IMF and World Bank. 
Saving and investment ratios in socialist countries were 
similar to those seen in countries that have been able to sus-
tain strong growth in the post-World War II period. Thus, 
the most successful South Asian economies or Japan, for 
example, are used to saving and investment ratios of about 
30% and higher. However, the efficiency of the investment 
undertaken by socialist economies was low since investments 
were normally not made on the basis of profitability but de-
termined by the objectives of the central plan, the bargain-
ing power of the different enterprises, and other non-
market criteria. 
The investment ratio in Central European countries seems 
to have begun declining during the 1980s, that is, even be-
fore the collapse of the communist regimes. Thus, graph 3, 
taken from Ickes ( 1993), shows a consistent reduction in all 
the major Central European countries (except Bulgaria) be-
tween 1980 and 1989. Furthermore, Ickes notes that not 
only the investment ratio but the also efficiency of invest-
ment fell during the 1980s. Why did saving and investment 
ratios in Central Europe began to fall in the 1980s? Ickes 
notes three possible factors. The first is the growing con-
tacts with the West which may have increased households' 
consumption aspirations and, therefore, the political cost 
for planners of postponing consumption. This cost was 
probably reinforced by the emergence of an internal politi-
cal opposition (exemplified by the birth of Solidarity in 
Poland in 1980) and the associated weakening of the 
communist regimes. Finally, the low and declining return 
on investment may have convinced the socialist planners 
that it was not worth maintaining such high investment ra-
tios. The recognition that those high rates of saving and in-
vestment were not producing the expected results in terms 
of economic performance was in fact one main motivation 
for economic reform in the former socialist countries. 
GRAPH 3 : Investment ratios in selected Central European 
countries during the 1980s *1' 
Percentage of GDP 
Hungary 
84 85 86 89 
2 Kornai (1992; pp. 160-70) discusses the ideological, political and institu-
tional motivations behind the high saving and investment rates that were ob-
served in socialist countries. 
(') Data not strictly comparable with those shown in table 1. 
Source: Ickes (1993). 
IL RECENT TRENDS IN SAVING AND 
INVESTMENT IN TRANSITION 
COUNTRIES 
Describing trends in saving and investment in transition 
economies is a task fraught with statistical difficulties. For 
most countries, there are no reliable historical national ac-
count series on saving and investment. Where recent and 
reliable data do exist, they are not easily comparable with 
the pre-transition statistics. Adequate breakdowns by sec-
tor (government, household, and enterprise) are normally 
not available. The statistical deficiencies are particularly 
serious for the republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU). 
The data analysed in this paper, therefore, are in most cases 
rough approximations or estimates and have to be taken 
with extreme caution. Having said that, the trends sug-
gested by the data are dramatic enough to be able to draw 
some tentative conclusions. 
The main sources of the data used in the paper are the IMF 
(both the aggregate data published in the World Economic 
Outlooks and more detailed, but often tentative, estimates 
provided by the staff of the IMF), the World Bank, the 
EBRD and the different national authorities. For a number 
of countries, basic sectoral breakdowns distinguishing 
government from non-government saving and investment 
have been tentatively estimated by using fiscal data to ob-
tain public saving and investment and deriving non-gov-
ernment saving and investment as residuals. 
ILI) Aggregate saving, aggregate investment and cur-
rent account balances. 
The trend towards a decline in national saving and invest-
ment ratios that socialist economies seem to have exper-
ienced during the 1980s accelerated after they began imple-
menting market-oriented reforms. As graph 1 indicates, 
the estimated average saving/GDP ratio of the Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEEC3) fell from 33.1% in 
1988 to only 17.9% in 1993, a ratio below the world aver-
age in that year (21.3%). The average investment/GDP 
ratio, for its part, is estimated to have declined from 31.8% 
in 1988 to 21.2% in 1993 (see graph 2). Since saving has on 
average declined even faster than investment, the saving-
investment balance of the region, an approximation of the 
current account balance, has deteriorated (on average by 
4.6 percentage points of GDP over the period), moving 
from a 1.3% surplus in 1988 to a 3.3% deficit in 1993. 
A similar picture emerges if we take the countries that were 
part of the former Soviet Union (FSU). According to IMF 
estimates, aggregate saving in the FSU declined from 32.1% 
of GDP in 1988 to 25.4% of GDP in 1993 (see graph l)4. Ag-
gregate investment, for its part, has fallen from 32.6% of 
GDP in 1989 to 23.2% of GDP in 1993. In contrast with 
what occurred in the CEEC, the aggregate saving-invest-
ment balance in the FSU improved (by 2.4 points of GDP) 
between 1988 and 1993, but it is tentatively estimated to 
have deteriorated again in 1994 reflecting a further sharp 
GRAPH 4 : Aggregate current account balance of transition 
countries ( 1 ' *2' 
In billion of US dollars 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
' " Including both Central and Eastern European countries and the NIS of the FSU. 
(2> For 1994, estimates. For 1995 and 1996, projections. 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1994). 
decline in saving ratios not offset by a continued reduction 
in investment ratios. Furthermore, the balance shows a clear 
deterioration if we compare the post-1989 period as a 
whole with the average of the 1980-88 period. 
Graph 4 shows the evolution of the aggregate current ac-
count of transition economies (Central and Eastern 
Europeplus the New Independent States of the FSU) since 
1977, as estimated by the OECD on the basis of balance of 
payments data. Three distinct periods can be observed. Be-
tween 1977 an 1981, the aggregate current account of the 
region was approximately in balance. Then, between 1982 
and 1988, it swung into a substantial surplus. Finally, the 
reform period has been characterized by a deficit in the ag-
gregate current account, with a very sharp deterioration in 
1989-90 followed by a substantial correction in 1991 and a 
mild trend towards an increasing deficit since 1993. Aggre-
gate data on the current account, therefore, confirm the pic-
ture obtained with the data on saving-investment bal-
ances5. 
II.2) Saving by sector 
While, as noted, appropriate national account breakdowns 
of saving by main sector are in general not available, fiscal 
data, partial information on the evolution of enterprise 
profitability and data on households' income and expendi-
ture indicate that the sharp decline of national saving ratios 
in transition countries (TC) is largely accounted for by the 
reduction in enterprise and public saving. Household sav-
ing ratios, by contrast, seem to be recovering in many 
countries from their very depressed pre-transition levels. 
In what follows, CEEC includes the Baltic states, the republics of the former 
Yugoslavia and Moldova, but excludes Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
This followed a gradual reduction of aggregate saving during the 1980s 
from an estimated peak of 34.3% of GDP in 1983. 
The current account data, however, show a higher surplus for the period 
1982-88 than the saving-investment data seem to imply. 
Enterprise saving 
The decline of enterprise profits, which were the ultimate 
source of most saving under the socialist system, is the 
basic factor behind the reduction in aggregate saving ratios 
in TC. The collapse of the CMEA markets, cuts in state 
subsidies, the domestic recession and the sharp changes in 
relative prices that have accompanied the transition pro­
cess have all had a very negative impact on corporate prof­
itability. While several Central European countries 
(Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) have been ex­
periencing since 1993 an improvement in enterprise saving 
as their economies have begun to strengthen, average profit 
margins remain at very low levels in most TC. These low 
levels of profitability often hide a dual situation, with large, 
state-controlled enterprises showing negative net savings 
(that is, losses after subtracting depreciation allowances) 
and some small and medium-sized enterprises in the 
emerging private sector enjoying high profit margins. 
Public saving 
As tables 1 and 2 show, TC have suffered an important de­
cline of public saving since 1989, with public saving in fact 
turning negative in many of them. The reduction of public 
saving has been particularly sharp in Bulgaria, Albania and 
the NIS. In Albania (and probably in some NIS) the in­
crease in public dissaving has even resulted in a negative 
national saving rate. Public saving in Central European 
countries is estimated to have declined on average from 
5.1% of GDP in 1987 to -0.9% of GDP in 1993. 
The contraction of public saving has been translated into 
substantial increases in the budget deficits despite the fact 
that, as explained below, public investment has also fallen 
in most countries. Table 3 shows the evolution of the gen­
eral government balances in TC since the beginning of 
their pro-market reforms. The only countries that have not 
suffered a substantial deterioration of their budget balances 
are the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Baltic countries, 
all of which have even been able to record budget surpluses 
at least for several years. In the Baltic countries, however, 
the good fiscal performance hides low and/or declining 
public saving rates coupled with low and/or declining 
public investment rates. In Central Europe the average 
budget deficit increased abruptly to around 9% of GDP in 
1991-92 but has declined to around 5% of GDP in 
1993-94. In the FSU the budgetary "explosion" began one 
year later but was even sharper, with the average budget 
deficit reaching more than 13% of GDP in 1992-93 (16.5 % 
of GDP if the Baltic countries are excluded). 
The recession and the budgetary costs associated with 
structural reform are the main factors behind the decline in 
public saving. With government revenues under central-
planning being dominated by taxes on enterprises (profit 
and turnover taxes, in particular), the compression of profit 
margins and the bankruptcy of many enterprises has re­
sulted in a substantial erosion of the traditional tax bases. 
Most TC are implementing comprehensive tax reforms to 
move away from enterprise taxation and into taxation of 
personal income and consumption. But, in the short-term, 
TABLE 3 : General government balances **' (in percent of GDP) 
1989 
"Central Europe" 
Albania *2' -
Bulgaria -1.4 
Former CSFR -2.4 
Czech Republic -
Slovak Republic 
Hungary -1.3 
Poland -7.4 
Romania 8.4 
Slovenia 0.3 
Simple average "Central Europe" -0.6 
Former Soviet Union 
Estonia 2.8 
Latvia 1 
Lithuania -3.8 
Belarus 
Moldova 2.3 
Ukraine 
Russia -
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 2.1 
Tajikistan *3) 2.5 
Turkmenistan -1.9 
Uzbekistan -0.9 
Simple average FSU 0.5 
Simple average FSU excluding Baltic states 0.7 
1990 
-12.7 
0.1 
0.5 
3.1 
1.2 
-0.3 
-1.4 
2.9 
2 
-3.7 
2.9 
1.4 
0.3 
4 
1.2 
-1.1 
1.1 
1.5 
1991 
-43.7 
-15.1 
-2 
-2.5 
-6.5 
0.6 
2.6 
-9.5 
4.6 
6.4 
4.9 
3.6 
0 
-13.6 
-1.9 
-5 
-3 
-7.9 
4.6 
-16.4 
2.5 
-3.6 
-1.8 
-3.7 
1992 
-21.8 
-14 
-3.3 
-5.5 
-6.7 
-4.6 
0.2 
-8.0 
0.5 
0 
0.7 
^1.5 
-21.1 
-29.3 
-18.8 
-30.6 
-26.8 
-28 
-7.3 
-13.5 
-29.9 
14.1 
-13 
-13.8 
-17.4 
1993 
-16 
-15.1 
1.4 
-7.5 
-5.9 
-2.9 
-0.1 
0.5 
-5.7 
-1.4 
1 
-5.2 
-9.4 
-12.5 
-9.7 
-8 
^16.4 
-14.4 
-34 
-1.1 
-8.2 
-23.6 
-3 
-15.7 
-12.8 
-15.5 
1994 
-14 
-7.8 
0.8 
-3.7 
-7.1 
-4.3 
-1.1 
-1 
-4.8 
0 
-2 
-4.9 
-15 
-6.8 
-9.1 
-12 
-A 
-A 
-8.9 
-10 
-7.0 
-8.7 
1995 
-13 
-7 
0.2 
-3.9 
-6.2 
-3.4 
-2 
-5.0 
-
-
-
— 
_ 
-
-
-
1996 
-9 
-4.1 
-0.3 
-4.9 
-5.6 
-Λ.2 
-2 
-A3 
-
-
-
— 
-
-
-
<" For 1994, preliminary estimates. For 1995 and 1996, forecasts. 
*2' After grants, on a cash basis. 
*3' Consolidated balance of the central government. 
Sources: European Commission, EBRD, OECD , IMF, World Bank, and national data. 
T A B L E 4 : Houselhold 
Bulgaria 
Estonia 
Former C S F R 
Czech Rep. 
Slovak Rep. 
Georgia *2 ' 
Hungary 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Average countries above 
Average O E C D countries 
saving ratios in 
3) 
(3) 
selected transition countries (in percent 
1985 
-
-
3.6 
-
-
10 
7.6 
-
-
-
5.3 
6.6 
10.6 
1986 
-
-
4.2 
-
-
7.6 
8.4 
- ' 
-
-
6.7 
6.7 
9.7 
1987 
-
-
4.3 
-
-
-
6.7 
-
7.9 
-
7.7 
6.7 
8.7 
of disposable 
1988 
-1 
-
3.7 
-
-
-
7.6 
4.4 
16.5 
3.4 
8.9 
6.2 
8.9 
income) 
1989 
- 5 
-
3.5 
-
-
13.8 
7 
8.1 
20.5 
6.2 
11.8 
8.2 
9.5 
1990 
-6 
7.9 
-0.2 
-
-
16 
11.8 
8.9 
25.5 
12.5 
13.7 
1 0.3 
10.8 
1991 
18 
16.8 
6.7 
-
-
17.4 
15.8 
6.2 
20.4 
5.5 
31.3 
15.2 
11.3 
1992 
17 
- 7 
5.5 
6.6 
3.3 
38 
13.8 
-
15.2 
14.1 
20.2 
15.5 
11.6 
1993(1) 
17.2 
-
-
7.9 
3.5 
-
6.7 
-
24.7 
-
-
12.0 
11.7 
*" For most countries preliminary estimates. 
W Increase in households' saving deposits over disposable income. 
<3' Simple arithmetic mean. 
Sources: National data, IMF, World Bank. 
the overhaul of the tax systems has tended to exacerbate the 
decline in government revenues by creating problems of 
disorganization and tax evasion. Tax collection has also 
been hampered by an expanding "grey economy" made up 
of numerous small-scale private entrepreneurs that operate 
unregistered. While explicit budgetary subsidies to con-
sumers and enterprises have generally been trimmed, the 
budget has often continued to cover the growing losses of 
large state-owned enterprises, particularly in many re-
publics of the FSU. This has sometimes taken place in an 
indirect and non-transparent way through off-budget 
funds or through operations to bail out the banking sys-
tems. The establishment of unemployment benefit systems 
and the increase in interest payments on the public debt are 
other important elements explaining the reduction in 
public saving in TC. 
Household saving 
Information on household disposable income and expendi-
ture for several TC suggests that the transition process has 
so far had a positive impact on household saving ratios. 
Table 4 shows that in most of the countries for which this 
information is available household saving as a percentage 
of disposable income has risen significantly since 19896. 
Thus, in the countries included in table 4, household saving 
has increased from a simple average of 6.6% of disposable 
income in 1985-88 (well below an OECD average of 9.5% 
for the same period) to 14.3% in 1991-93 (above an OCDE 
average of 11.5% for the same period). 
the state to the private sector. Second, transition should 
tend to increase the portion of disposable income saved by 
households both because under a market economy the mo-
tives and opportunities for saving are reinforced and be-
cause of the specific uncertainties associated with transi-
tion itself. The following paragraphs elaborate on this 
second reason to expect an increased role of household sav-
ing in TC7. 
The main motives why households save are the desire to 
smooth consumption over the life-cycle (basically the 
need to save for retirement), the desire to leave bequests, 
and as a precautionary reserve against uncertainty. These 
motives for saving, however, were considerably attenuated 
in the socialist economies. The need to save for retirement 
was reduced by an almost universal state pension system 
which guaranteed the replacement of a relatively high pro-
portion of pre-retirement earnings. The equally universal 
provision of education and the fact that the state owned 
most of the housing stock (a component of wealth which 
accounts for the bulk of the intergenerational transfers in 
Western countries) lessened the need to save for bequests. 
There was also a smaller need for precautionary saving 
since cyclical fluctuations of output rarely led to fluctu-
ations of employment. Finally, the state-ownership of real 
assets and the underdevelopment of the financial markets 
meant that households had a very limited choice of instru-
ments in which to place their savings. Practically the only 
financial assets available to households were saving de-
posits at saving banks which normally paid negative real 
rates of return. 
An increase in the contribution of household saving to total 
national saving from its negligible pre-transition share is 
in fact what should be expected as TC move from a central-
ly-planned to a market economy. And this for two different 
reasons. First, as indicated in section I, with the transition 
to a capitalist system the share of households disposable in-
come in total income should increase as the ownership of 
national wealth is, to a significant extent, transferred from 
The main exceptions are Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Under 
the Czechoslovak federation, household saving remained within a range of 
only 3.5-5.5% of disposable income throughout most of the period of 
analysis, and even became slightly negative in 1990 reflecting strong 
household purchases in anticipation of the 1991 price liberalization. After 
the split of the federation, the household saving ratio has been close to the 
lower end of that range in Slovakia and has only recovered moderately in 
the Czech Republic. In Hungary, household saving increased dramatically 
in 1990-92 but fell again quite strongly in 1993 contributing to the deterio-
ration suffered by the Hungarian current account in 1993-94. 
This section draws on Ickes(1993). 
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On the other hand, there were some reasons for household 
saving in socialist economies that are not present (at least to 
the same extent) in market economies. Thus, given the ab-
sence of a consumer loan market, households had to accu-
mulate cash to be able to finance purchases of consumer 
durables. In addition, rationing in the goods market pro-
vided a motive for precautionary saving which is absent in 
capitalist economies: the convenience of having cash at 
hand to take advantage of any temporary availability of the 
desired consumer goods. In some instances, price controls 
and excess demand situations may have also resulted in 
"forced saving" in the form of a "monetary overhang". 
Some economists have argued, for example, that forced 
saving partly explains the consistent rise in the Russian 
household saving ratio seen during the 1980s (see table 4)8. 
But, all in all, it remains true that the need and opportu-
nities for household saving in socialist economies were li-
mited compared to those prevailing in market economies. 
By putting an end to the high degree of paternalistic protec-
tion provided by the socialist state against personal mis-
haps, the transition to a market economy should make con-
sumers aware of their own need to save and, therefore, 
should tend to increase household saving ratios. Transition 
should also impact favourably household saving ratios by 
increasing uncertainty about income and employment, par-
ticularly during the early stages of the transition process, 
which are being characterized in most countries by re-
cession and a sharp rise in unemployment. The emergence 
of new real and financial assets in which households may 
hold their wealth (privatization of the housing stock and 
the state enterprises, freedom to set up small family busi-
ness, the possibility to invest in equity, bonds or the newly-
created investment and pension funds, etc) and the increase 
in real interest rates on bank deposits to positive and at-
tractive levels should also encourage savings. In addition, 
to the extent that transition leads, as it seems to be happen-
ing in several countries, to a more uneven income distribu-
tion, it will tend to increase household saving ratios by 
shifting income towards households with a higher propen-
sity to save. The joint operation of all these different factors 
probably explains the increase in household saving ratios 
shown in table 4. 
The fear that transition would lead to a temporary reduction 
of household saving ratios as households got rid of the 
monetary overhangs accumulated before 1989 has not been 
confirmed, at least with the limited statistical information 
currently available. Either, as some economist have ar-
gued, there was never such a monetary overhang or, more 
probably, it was much more limited than had been sug-
gested and disappeared overnight when the price-jump as-
sociated with price liberalization eroded the real value of 
the money balances held by the population. Furthermore, 
Other authors, however, have questioned the validity of the "monetary over-
hang hypothesis" on the basis of both empirical and theoretical arguments (in-
cluding the existence of black markets). See, for example, E. Borensztein and 
PJ. Montiel (1991), pp. 16-19. 
any negative impact on household saving ratios arising 
from the elimination of the overhang may have been more 
than offset by the other factors at work that have tended to 
increase household saving in TC. 
II.3) Investment by sector 
For most transition countries, available sectoral break-
downs of total investment only distinguish government in-
vestment from non-government investment, with the latter 
being obtained as a residual. However, with household in-
vestment normally being of little importance (particularly 
in the pre-reform period), the evolution of non-govern-
ment investment can be taken as a reasonable approxima-
tion for the trend in corporate investment. 
Investment by enterprises 
Corporate investment (proxied with non-government in-
vestment in tables 1 and 2) has fallen dramatically as a per-
centage of GDP in most TC since 1989. Table 1, for 
example, shows a decline in non-government investment 
in Central European countries from around 24% of GDP in 
1987-90 to less than 14% of GDP in 1993. In certain 
countries, in particular Romania and Estonia, investment/ 
GDP ratios have remained stable or even increased in spite 
of the fact that, like in the other TC, domestic investment 
has fallen sharply in real absolute terms between 1989 and 
1993. But, apart from possible statistical deficiencies, this 
reflects the fact that consumption + net exports, and there-
fore GDP, have been falling even more sharply than invest-
ment. A drastic compression of real disposable income (as 
real wages have declined and unemployment have risen) 
and the collapse of the CMEA markets explain this. Also, 
in some countries (notably in Romania) the transition pro-
cess has been accompanied by a strong build-up of enter-
prise stocks. 
Why has corporate investment in TC fallen so much? The 
main reason is that to the usual negative impact of re-
cession on enterprise investment has been added the nega-
tive implications of transition itself. When the central plan 
controls have been loosened but the state enterprises have 
not yet been privatized, enterprises fall into a sort of "no-
man's land", sometimes called "pre-privatization limbo", 
where no real owners exist and managers have no incen-
tives to invest. Managers often do not know whether they 
will continue in their posts after the enterprise is privatized 
and restructured. Even the future of the enterprise as such 
may be uncertain. Under this conditions, managers and 
workers are interested in grabbing whatever income or en-
terprise assets they can before they are forced to find alter-
native employment. Managers yield to wage pressures and 
use most income flow or even sell off machinery to pay for 
higher wages. "Asset-plundering" by managers is also 
common under these circumstances. 
Transition also has a negative impact on enterprise invest-
ment because of the economic and political uncertainty it 
involves. Most investments have little value in alternative 
lo-
uses and can be considered, from the point of view of the 
investor, as a "sunk cost" that he will be unable to recover if 
things go wrong and he has to withdraw from the activity. 
Thus, even if the risk-return combination of the envisaged 
investment is attractive (as it is often the case in TC), the 
investor may find it optimal to wait and decide at a later 
stage whether to undertake the project. The cost of waiting 
is low and the benefit ("the option value of waiting"), 
should things take a turn for the worse, may be very high. 
Starting in 1993 or 1994, however, corporate investment 
has began to recover both in absolute real terms and as a 
percentage of GDP in several Central European countries, 
notably in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Albania (see table 1). 
mally small and medium sized) promising private enter-
prises. 
The combination of high budget deficits and weak and in-
efficient financial systems in effect means that a large share 
of the scarce pool of private saving in TC is used to finance 
dissaving by the government and loss-making enterprises. 
This not only provides a further explanation for the col-
lapse of enterprise investment since 1989 (since loss-mak-
ing enterprises often invest little, at least relative to their 
size), but also tends to perpetuate low average profitability 
and, therefore, a low rate of saving in the enterprise sector. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF POPULATION AGEING 
ON SAVING 
Public investment 
As tables 1 and 2 show, public investment has also been on 
a downward trend in most TC since the beginning of the re-
forms. Two warnings, however, must be given on the relia-
bility of the data on public investment presented in these 
tables. For the pre-transition period and for several 
countries, the statistics shown in tables 1 and 2 may include 
investment actually undertaken not by the state but by state 
enterprises, which would exaggerate the downward ten-
dency in public investment recorded since 1989. Second, 
in several countries public investment is overstated (both 
in the pre-transition and the post-transition figures) be-
cause the data also include capital transfers from the state. 
Despite the apparent downward trend since 1989, public 
investment/GDP ratios remain on average at approximate-
ly the levels normally seen in industrial countries. Thus, for 
those countries for which a basic sectoral breakdown of in-
vestment is available, the average public investment/GDP 
ratio was 3.6% in 1993, exactly the same as the average 
ratio in industrial countries in that same year, and some-
what above the ratio of the European Union (3.2%). 
III. THE PROBLEM OF THE ALLOCATION OF 
SAVING 
Saving in TC not only has declined sharply but, in a large 
number of countries, is mostly absorbed by the state to fi-
nance its public investment and its dissaving, resulting in 
the crowding out of private investment. Furthermore, the 
small part that is not absorbed by the state is to a consider-
able extent channelled by the financial system to loss-
making enterprises and sectors, or goes to finance subopti-
mal investments. Most private saving is intermediated by 
inefficient banking sectors which are saddled with bad 
loans, are largely controlled by the state, and lack competi-
tion and adequate credit-risk assessment skills. In this con-
text, non-performing loans are often rolled-over automati-
cally to large, loss-making state-owned enterprises, while 
commercial bank financing is severely restricted for (nor-
In a development similar to that observed in most Western 
countries, low and falling birth rates are increasing the ratio 
of elderly people to the working age population in TC. As 
table 5 shows, the ratio of pensioners to employed people 
has been rising in all TC since the reforms began. Further-
more, with the exception of some of the Central Asian re-
publics of the FSU, both the share of elderly people over 
total population and overall dependency ratios in TC are 
projected to continue increasing steeply over the coming 
years and decades. 
TABLE 5 : Old-age economic dependency 
economies*1) 
"Central Europe" 
Albania 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovak Republic 
Simple average "Central 
Europe" 
Former Soviet Union 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Belarus 
Moldova 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Simple average FSU 
1985 
18 
50 
54 
36 
18 
-
35 
43 
40 
41 
42 
35 
42 
47 
28 
34 
37 
31 
34 
27 
25 
30 
36 
ri) Ratio of pensioners to employed person; 
Source: International Monetary Fund (1994). 
1990 
22 
58 
38 
55 
55 
43 
22 
51 
42 
48 
43 
47 
46 
41 
45 
52 
34 
40 
38 
33 
35 
27 
25 
30 
39 
ratios in 
1991 
28 
68 
45 
59 
57 
51 
26 
61 
48 
-
46 
48 
49 
41 
47 
54 
35 
44 
45 
35 
36 
29 
28 
30 
41 
, in percent. 
transition 
1992 
38 
80 
57 
61 
64 
57 
29 
67 
55 
54 
48 
49 
52 
44 
51 
59 
41 
39 
54 
38 
35 
31 
28 
32 
44 
1993 
45 
86 
63 
31 
-
56 
-
52 
48 
55 
45 
52 
62 
46 
41 
40 
36 
33 
28 
33 
44 
Table 7 displays World Bank data and projections for the 
percentage of the population over 60 years old in TC and in 
other main groups of countries for the period 1990-2030. 
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This table shows that TC and OECD countries had by far 
the oldest populations in the world in 1990, with an average 
share of people over 60 years about three times higher than 
in the other regions of the world. It also shows that the share 
is expected to rise in TC from a weighted average of 15.3% 
in 1990 to 22.7% in 2030. Although the projected ageing of 
the population in TC is not as fast as in the OECD countries 
or in Latin America, the population of TC (particularly if 
the Central Asian republics of the FSU are excluded) will 
continue to have in the year 2030 a much higher share of 
elderly people than all other country groupings except the 
OECD countries. 
TABLE 6 : Overall dependency ratios in transition and 
Western European countries*1' 
Actual 1990 Projected*2) 2030 
dependency ratio dependency ratio 
CEEC *3> 
Russia +Ukraine 
+Belarus+ Moldova 
EU-12 
EFTA-6 
Total CEEC + European FSU 
Total EU-12 +EFTA-6 
52.5 
53.9 
48.5 
50.6 
53.4 
48.7 
60.3 
63.9 
71.3 
73.2 
62.6 
71.5 
ri) Ratio of non-working age population (ages 0-14 and over 64) to working age 
population, in percent. 
<2) As projected by the World Bank (World Population Projections, 1992-93). 
,3) Albania, Croatia, the Baltic states, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. 
Source: Baldwin (1994) 
Table 6 indicates that the economic burden associated with 
the ageing of the population in TC will not be offset by a 
decrease in the share of the dependent young to the popula-
tion. This table shows that also the overall dependency ra-
tios, that is, the ratio of non-working age population (ages 
0-14 and over 64) to the working age population, will in-
crease substantially between 1990 and 2030 (although, 
again, less rapidly than in Western countries). 
The expected rapid increase in the overall demographic de-
pendency ratios in TC from their already high present le-
vels can have important negative implications for both 
public and household saving ratios. Current public pension 
systems in TC are of a pay-as-you go nature, and often 
have overly generous wage replacement rates and liberal 
early retirement and disability provisions. Therefore, un-
less public pensions are reformed and alternative pensions 
schemes are developed (see section VI), this will impose a 
further burden on the already overwhelmed public pension 
systems, limiting any increase in public saving that may 
stem from economic recovery and successful enterprise 
and financial restructuring. 
The projected ageing of the population of TC may also 
have a negative effect on household saving since the elder-
ly tend to have a low, or even negative, saving rate. This 
could be particularly true in TC since population ageing in 
these countries is basically due to low and declining birth 
rates, rather than to a lengthening of the life expectancy. 
When ageing is also due to a lengthening of the life expect-
ancy, the negative impact on household saving resulting 
from the increase in the share of old people may be offset 
(at least partly) by the positive effect of a longer expected 
retirement period on saving by middle-age households. 
But very few TC are experiencing an increase in their life 
expectancies. In fact, life expectancy seems to have decreased 
TABLE 7 : Percentage of population over sixty years 
transition countries (1990-2030) 
"Central Europe" 
Albania 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. of 
Simple average "Central Europe" 
Former Soviet Union 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Belarus 
Moldova 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Simple average FSU 
Simple average "Central Europe" 
Weighted average "Central 
Europe" + FSU 
Memorandum items: 
OECD*1) 
Latin America and Caribbean *'' 
Middle East and North Africa *'' 
Sub-Sahara Africa *'> 
1990 
8.1 
19.7 
17.8 
16.9 
19.3 
14.8 
15.6 
16.2 
13.6 
15.8 
17.2 
17.9 
16.2 
17.6 
12.5 
16.5 
18.7 
11 
9 
15.9 
9.5 
8.5 
6.2 
6.3 
6.5 
12.6 
13.8 
15.3 
18.2 
6.9 
5.7 
4.6 
2000 
9.7 
22.8 
21.2 
16.9 
20.9 
16.2 
17.8 
19.4 
17.3 
18.0 
19 
20 
18.2 
19.4 
13.8 
18.7 
21.3 
13.4 
10.9 
18.2 
11.5 
8.7 
6.2 
6.5 
6.7 
14.2 
15.6 
17 
19.9 
7.7 
6 
4.4 
2010 
11.4 
24.9 
23.9 
19.2 
23.1 
17.5 
17.9 
22.7 
18.8 
19.9 
20.8 
21.2 
19.7 
20.5 
14.7 
20.5 
22.1 
14.5 
11.3 
18.9 
12.9 
8.8 
6 
7 
7 
15.1 
16.9 
18.2 
23.1 
9.3 
6.5 
4.5 
old in 
2020 
14.9 
26.3 
26.9 
22.6 
26.7 
22.2 
20.2 
26.5 
22.2 
23.2 
23.6 
24.2 
23.5 
24.1 
17.3 
24.4 
24.5 
19.6 
15.9 
22.3 
16.7 
11.8 
8.2 
10.2 
10.2 
18.4 
20.2 
21.5 
27 
12.2 
8 
4.9 
2030 
19.1 
26.7 
28.7 
24 
26.8 
23.3 
21.9 
29.1 
24.9 
24.9 
25.1 
25.9 
26.3 
25.3 
17.8 
24.9 
25.5 
22.1 
19.9 
24.4 
18.8 
14.2 
10.8 
13.1 
13.2 
20.5 
22.2 
22.7 
30.7 
16 
9.8 
5.9 
(!) Weighted average. 
Source: World Bank (1994). 
in several TC (particularly in Russia) since the beginning 
of the pro-market reforms, probably reflecting economic 
and political instability and increased income inequality9. 
The possible negative effect of ageing on private saving, 
however, will be attenuated if people anticipate that the 
government will in the future increase taxes or curb pension 
benefits to ensure the sustainability of the pension system. 
See "Eastern European Demography: Of Death and Dying", The Econom-
ist, 7 January 1994, pp.27-28, and "Former Soviet Countries Face Popula-
tion Crisis, Study Asserts", The Wall Street Journal, 13-14 January 1994. 
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V. PROSPECTS: HOW WILL GROWTH BE 
FINANCED? 
The successful transformation of the formerly planned 
economies of Europe and Asia into market economies will 
require substantial amounts of new investment in the next 
15-20 years. The question that it is often posed is where the 
savings necessary to finance such investment will come 
from. More specifically, will the saving come primarily 
from new demands on the international capital markets, or 
will TC rely mainly on internally generated saving? 
In recent years, both economic studies and statements by 
policy-makers have warned about the risk that the com-
bination of low saving ratios and huge investment needs in 
TC may significantly add to upward pressures on global 
real interest rates in the coming years. This danger, how-
ever, is probably overstated. While external capital is play-
ing and is likely to continue playing in the future an import-
ant role in the transition process, the experience of other 
countries suggests that future investment in TC is likely to 
be mostly financed by domestic savings. Starting with 
work by Feldstein and Horioka (1980), econometric 
studies have generally found that there continues to be 
(despite the important increase in the international mobil-
ity of financial capital since the 1960s) a very high degree 
of correlation between national saving and investment 
rates, and this seems to hold both for industrial and devel-
oping countries10. To put some examples, the post-war re-
coveries in Europe and Japan, and the high rates of invest-
ment experienced by Spain in the 1960s and by the new 
industrialized countries of Asia in the last three decades, 
have all been accompanied by high rates of domestic saving. 
The fear that TC will exert an excessive pressure on world 
capital markets reflects both an exaggeration of the likely 
increase in their investment demand in the coming years 
and a failure to recognize the capacity of those countries' 
domestic saving rates to recover as their economies 
strengthen. Let us look at each of these elements in turn. 
Many of the estimates made in the past of the investment 
needs of TC have been based on the assumption that TC 
catch-up with Western per capita income levels or capital/ 
output ratios within a specified, and often relatively short, 
period of time. It is not a wonder, therefore, that those 
studies have normally arrived at staggeringly high invest-
ment needs for the area11. This approach, however, has 
serious deficiencies. Not only does it assume ambitious 
catching-up scenarios but tends to confuse investment 
needs with actual investment demand. As discussed in sec-
tion II, while investment/GDP ratios are beginning to recover 
in those TC that have made more progress in stabilization 
and reform, in many TC (particularly among the re-
publics of the FSU) the recovery of investment will con-
tinue to be held up in the coming years by political uncer-
tainty, macroeconomic instability and insufficient progress 
in the area of structural transformation. 
Furthermore, TC may be able, at least during an initial 
period, to sustain high rates of growth with relatively mod-
erate ratios of investment to GDP. The inefficiency of past 
investment patterns, and the fact that a considerable frac-
tion of the capital stock inherited from the socialist period 
will be of little value under a market economy, mean that 
there is a relative shortage of useful productive capital in 
TC. This will tend to make investment in TC very productive, 
at least initially. Thus, Borensztein and Montiel (1991) 
estimated that during the first ten years of transition 
Hungary, Poland and the former Czechoslovakia could 
sustain rates of growth of between 4 and 7% of GDP with 
an investment/GDP ratio of only 22% (which is close to the 
world average). 
Regarding saving, the low current rates of saving in TC re-
flect to a considerable extent the recession and the initial 
difficulties linked to the process of systemic transform-
ation. As transition economies gradually strengthen and 
enterprise and financial sector restructuring proceeds, do-
mestic saving ratios are bound to increase. This is particu-
larly clear in the case of corporate saving, since enterprise 
profitability is likely to improve quickly with the cyclical 
conditions of the economy. Other things being constant, 
economic recovery and structural progress will also tend to 
increase public saving, both by increasing revenues and by 
reducing unemployment benefits and (explicit and impli-
cit) subsidies to loss-making enterprises and banks. Final-
ly, as the life-cycle theory of saving suggests, higher econ-
omic growth may have a positive impact on household 
saving by increasing the gap between the lifetime income 
of current workers and that of retired workers. The positive 
influence of economic expansion and structural reform on 
public and household saving, however, may be offset, at 
least partially, by the demographic developments dis-
cussed above unless governments in TC move fast to de-
velop multi-pillar pension systems. 
10 Goldstein and Mussa (1993) provide an interesting survey of the literature 
on saving and investment correlations. 
11 Collins and Rodrik (1991) discuss this and other approaches followed in 
different studies that have attempted to measure the investment needs of TC. 
Assuming a scenario of partial catching-up with EU's per capita income le-
vels by the year 2002, Boote ( 1992) also concludes that TC will require very 
high investment rates unless the efficiency of investment is radically im-
proved. 
TABLE 8 : European Commission forecasts for associated 
countries*1' 
Real GDP growth 
Fixed investment growth 
(in real terms) 
Unemployment rate 
Private consumption deflator 
General government balance 
(in percent of GDP) 
Current account balance 
(in percent of GDP) 
Household saving rate (2) 
(in percent of disposable income) 
1993 
1 
-1.3 
12.7 
55.6 
-3.7 
-4 
10 
1994 
3.1 
8.5 
13 
41.6 
-4 
-2.7 
9.3 
1995 
3.2 
6.4 
13.4 
22 
-3.5 
-2.6 
7.7 
1996 
3.8 
9 
13.5 
16.3 
-3.9 
-2.6 
8 
O Weighted averages of forecasts for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia. 
*2) Excludes Romania. 
Source/General Directorate for Economic and Financial Affairs, European 
Commission. December 1994. 
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The bulk of the rise in saving necessary to finance higher 
investment in TC is, therefore, likely to come from in-
creased corporate savings. Indeed, as in most of the suc-
cessful economies, much of the new investments under-
taken by private enterprises will be directly financed with 
retained profits. Mayer (1989), for example, found that re-
tained earnings accounted for more than 65% of the gross 
financing of non-financial enterprises in the UK and the 
US over the period 1970-85. The latest economic forecasts 
for CEEC made by the Commission services are also con-
sistent with the view that corporate saving will play a pre-
dominant role as a source of finance for future investment 
growth in TC. Table 8 shows the aggregate Commission 
forecasts for the main macroeconomic variables. The fore-
casts refer only to those CEEC that have signed association 
agreements with the EU and cover the period 1994-96. 
They foresee stable average budget and current account 
deficits as a percentage of GDP, which can reasonably be 
taken to imply a stable rate of public saving and a constant 
rate of reliance on foreign saving. The forecasts also show 
some reduction in the average household saving ratio, and 
a clear recovery of domestic investment leading to an in-
crease in investment/GDP ratios. Now, since public, 
foreign and household saving ratios are expected to remain 
constant (or decline moderately), the forecasts imply that 
the expected rise in the investment ratios will be financed 
with a corresponding increase in corporate saving ratios. 
But perhaps the most robust piece of evidence suggesting 
that the recovery of investment/GDP ratios in TC will 
largely be financed by an increase in domestic saving, and 
in particular corporate saving, is the recent experience of 
the most advanced Central European countries. As table 1 
shows, the recovery experienced by corporate investment 
ratios in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in 
1993-94 has been largely self-financed through an im-
provement in enterprise profitability. 
The previous analysis, however, should not be taken to 
mean that external capital will not play an important role in 
the financing of investment growth in TC. Even if the aver-
age current account deficit of the "associated countries" re-
mains at present levels, as the Commission forecasts, it 
will still imply an inflow of foreign saving of about 3% of 
GDP per year. The forecasts for all CEEC contained in the 
IMF World Economic Outlook of October 1994 tell a simi-
lar story (see graphs 1 and 2): average saving and invest-
ment ratios of CEEC are both projected to increase by 1 % 
of GDP between 1993 and 1995, leaving a 3.3% of GDP 
gap to be covered by foreign capital. Moreover, it is per-
fectly possible that the recovery of domestic saving will lag 
somewhat behind that of domestic investment (for 
example, if the governments of those countries use in-
creased revenues from growth to finance discretionary in-
creases in expenditure programmes). 
Official external capital flows, in particular, will continue 
to play a vital role in TC, specially during the early stages 
of the transformation process. Conditional official assist-
ance linked to sensible reform programs will not only con-
tribute directly to cover the gap between domestic saving 
and investment but will also act as a catalyst for domestic 
and foreign investment by reducing uncertainty and in-
creasing the chances that the reforms will succeed. As sys-
temic transformation proceeds, those countries with a 
stable macroeconomic framework should be able to in-
creasingly rely (as some are already doing) on private capi-
tal inflows to cover the current account gap and any debt re-
payments. Since the average investment-saving gap is likely 
to remain in the order of 2-4% of GDP for many years to 
come, the external capital needs of TC will no doubt continue 
to put some upward pressure on global real interest rates. But 
the main point of this section is that, since the bulk of the fore-
seeable increase in domestic investment will be mostly fi-
nanced by an increase in domestic saving, such pressure will 
be much less important than it has often been claimed. 
TABLE 9 : Saving and investment ratios in developing countries classified by financial criteria (in percent of GDP) 
Market borrowers 
Saving 
Investment 
Official borrowers 
Saving 
Investment 
Countries with recent 
debt-servicing difficulties 
Saving 
Investment 
Countries without 
debt-servicing difficulties 
Saving 
Investment 
All developing countries 
Saving 
Investment 
<" Excluding transition countries 
Source: IMF (1994). 
1977-81 
25.2 
28.3 
19.5 
24 
22.6 
25.7 
25.5 
27.2 
25.4 
26.4 
1982-86 
25 
26.5 
13.8 
18.8 
16.6 
20 
25.9 
28 
21.9 
24.2 
1987 
29.3 
28.8 
14.4 
18.7 
18.5 
20.3 
29.3 
29.6 
24.6 
25.2 
See IMF ( 1994) for a precise definition of the different 
1988 
29.5 
29.9 
13.8 
18 
18.3 
20.6 
29.5 
30.3 
24.6 
25.9 
1989 
29.5 
29.9 
14.2 
18.5 
18.9 
20.7 
29.4 
30.6 
25.1 
26.2 
country groupings presented 
1990 
30 
29.3 
15.6 
17.9 
18.2 
19.3 
29.9 
30.5 
25.3 
25.8 
in the table. 
1991 
29.2 
29.2 
15.5 
17.8 
17.1 
18.9 
30.4 
30.6 
24.4 
25.9 
1992 
28.3 
30.6 
14.2 
17.9 
16.6 
19.4 
31 
31.6 
25.3 
27 
1993 
28.3 
30.6 
13.5 
17.5 
16.1 
19.3 
29.1 
31.2 
24.1 
26.6 
1994 
28.4 
30.5 
14.5 
18 
16.8 
19.7 
29.1 
30.9 
24.6 
26.8 
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VI. POSSIBLE POLICY MEASURES FOR IN-
CREASING THE LEVEL AND IMPROVING 
THE ALLOCATION OF SAVING 
VI. 1) General policy recommendations 
The authorities should pursue policies conducive to a 
stable macroeconomic framework and sustainable growth. 
Not only economic growth leads, as noted in the previous 
section, to higher saving ratios, but empirical evidence on 
developing countries12 indicates that those countries that 
have managed to keep low inflation rates and low levels of 
foreign indebtedness have tended to display higher natio-
nal saving rates than those that did not. In addition, those 
countries that succeeded in keeping their macroeconomic 
house in order received more foreign direct investment and 
enjoyed a higher degree of access to the international capi-
tal markets. In other words, countries that applied prudent 
economic policies not only were able to have higher 
national saving but were also able to obtain a higher 
amount of foreign saving. 
Table 9 illustrates some of these regularities by displaying 
data on saving and investment ratios for different groups of 
developing countries classified by financial criteria. The 
figures have been obtained from the IMF World Economic 
Outlook of October 1994. They show that developing 
countries with debt servicing difficulties have tended to 
have much lower saving ratios than those without foreign 
debt problems. It also indicates that countries with good ac-
cess to the international capital markets ("market bor-
rowers") have had on average much higher saving and in-
vestment ratios than those which largely depended on 
official assistance ("official borrowers"). While table 9 
says nothing about the direction of causality (which is like-
ly to operate in both ways), it is consistent with the idea that 
countries that apply sound economic policies tend to have 
higher national saving rates and that countries with high 
national saving rates tend to have easier access to foreign 
sources of saving. 
VI.2) Monetary policy 
Monetary policy can play a significant role not only by en-
suring, in conjunction with fiscal policy, price stability and 
a sustainable current account, but also by guaranteeing (in 
combination with the liberalization of domestic interest 
rates) a positive and sufficiently attractive real remuner-
ation for depositors. Avoiding negative real interest rates 
may raise the overall level of private saving and, perhaps 
more importantly, can prevent the channeling of scarce do-
mestic saving abroad (for example, in the form of capital 
flight). It can also prevent the channeling of domestic sav-
ing away from the banking system or organized markets 
and into informal, and normally less efficient, domestic fi-
nancial markets. 
VI.3) Fiscal measures 
Increasing public saving is probably the safest and most di-
rect way in which the authorities in TC can have a positive 
impact on aggregate saving. Governments in TC should be 
extremely careful with the short-term fiscal costs of any 
tax reform aimed at encouraging household saving. As the 
experience of other countries seems to show13, while the 
impact of tax incentives on household saving is at best 
moderate and of a medium-term nature, their fiscal costs 
can be quite important. In trying to encourage household 
saving, therefore, the government may reduce (particularly 
in the short-term) both public saving and national saving. 
A given increase in public saving is likely to have a larger 
effect on national saving if it is achieved through cuts in 
current expenditure than if it is done through an equivalent 
increase in taxes. This is because tax increases reduce 
households' disposable income and, therefore, lead to both 
lower consumption and lower saving by households (re-
gardless of what happens to the household saving ratio). 
Even if it is achieved through cuts in public expenditure, an 
increase in public saving is likely to be offset to some ex-
tent by a reduction in private saving as households antici-
pate higher future taxes. However, the empirical literature 
on the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis mostly finds that 
this compensation is only partial. Furthermore, not even a 
partial Ricardian reaction by consumers will take place if 
the increase in public saving was to be accompanied by an 
equivalent increase in public investment, or if both taxes 
and public investment were increased in the same amount, 
leaving the budget deficit unchanged. 
The authorities of TC should avoid making interest ex-
penses on consumer borrowing deductible for tax pur-
poses, except perhaps in the case of house mortgages. In-
discriminate tax deductibility for consumer interest not 
only lowers government saving but may also reduce house-
hold saving by incentivating current consumption. Tax-fa-
voured mortgages may encourage household saving by en-
couraging investment in housing. But they can lead to an 
overinvestment in housing to the detriment of productive, 
non-residential investment. Furthermore, they may actual-
ly reduce household saving if the regulations do not pre-
vent the u se of mortgage credit to finance purchases of con-
sumer goods and/or if (as, for example, in Sweden in 
1980s) they increase households' wealth by contributing to 
a boom in house prices. 
There is some evidence for industrial countries that tax de-
ductibility of consumer interest, particularly when coupled 
with financial liberalization, has had a negative impact on 
national saving14. Given that TC are developing the previ-
ously inexistent consumer loan markets, granting interest 
deductibility for consumer borrowing clearly risks having, 
particularly in the short rum a negative impact on national 
saving in those countries. 
See, for example, Aghevli and others (1990), pp.35-38. 
13 See, for example, B. Bosworth (1991) and Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994). 
14 See, for example, Tanzi (1988), quoted by Aghevli and others (1990), 
and Carroll and Summers (1987). 
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VI.4) Financial sector measures 
Recapitalizing and strengthening the balance-sheets of 
commercial and saving banks of TC and increasing com­
petition among them would stimulate both saving and in­
vestment by allowing a reduction in their large lending-de-
posit spreads. Stronger, more efficient and less 
state-controlled banking sectors would also improve the 
allocation of saving among alternative investment projects 
and borrowers. Over the medium run, this would tend to in­
crease corporate saving by eliminating the implicit sub­
sidization of loss-making enterprises through the roll-over 
of non-performing loans and by facilitating the emergence of 
high-profit enterprises in the new private sector. 
The development of modern, diversified and liquid capital 
markets would also have positive implications for both the 
level and the allocation of saving in TC. In particular, by 
increasing the number of financial instruments in which 
households may place their savings, it could stimulate 
household saving. In this respect, it is also important that 
interest rates be liberalized. 
Finally, a financial sector-fiscal measure that could have a 
positive effect both on private saving and, in the future, on 
public saving is the reform of the public pension systems. 
The current, pay-as-you-go public pension systems 
should be reformed and downsized, and complementary 
private pension schemes should be developed based on the 
principle of full funding. As noted in section IV, this is par­
ticularly urgent given that TC, like OECD countries, are 
confronted with high and rapidly rising dependency ratios. 
In a recent study on the implications of the ageing of the 
world population, the World Bank (1994) has proposed the 
development of pension systems consisting of three pil­
lars: a mandatory, tax-financed public pillar with the li­
mited objective of alleviating old age poverty; a manda­
tory, privately managed and fully funded pillar (for 
example, in the form of occupational plans offered by en­
terprises); and a "voluntary pillar" for people wishing to 
have extra protection after retirement15. The creation of 
private pension systems, in turn, provides a further justi­
fication for the modernization of the capital markets since 
these markets will have to meet the sophisticated invest­
ment requirements of private pension funds. 
15 The World Bank study also discusses how countries should move from a 
pay-as-you-go public system to such a multi-pillar structure. 
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Principal economie policy measures ­ May 1995 
Community (EUR-15) 
¡7.5 The Commission publishes its new economic forecasts. 
31.5 The Commission adopts its recommendation for the Broad Guide­
lines of the Economic policies of the Member States and the Community. 
31.5 The Commission adopts its green paper on the practical arrange­
ments for the introduction of the single currency. 
Belgium (B) 
15.5 The central bank decides to cut two of its key interest rates from the 
same date. It reduces the central rate from 4.75% to 4.50% and the rate 
on advances within the ceiling from 6.25% to 6%. The discount rate re­
mains unchanged at 4.%. 
Denmark (DK) 
18.5 The central bank cuts the repo rate from 6.5% to 6.35%. 
Germany (D) 
None. 
Greece (GR) 
None. 
Spain (E) 
6.5 The Spanish government approves the establishment of private, 
non­profit placement agencies: they will cooperate with the public em­
ployment service (INEM) and the "Servicios Integrados para el em­
pleo", which provide information and training for the unemployed. 
France 
None. 
Ireland (IRL) 
None. 
Italy (I) 
8.5 An agreement between the government and the unions is reached 
over the reform of the pension system, under which there will be a closer 
relationship between contribution and benefits, life expectancy will be 
assessed on retirement, and the treatment of different categories will be 
standardized. The new system will apply in full to new workers and only 
partially to workers with fewer than 18 years' contributions. Workers 
with more than 18 years' contributions will continue under the present 
system with some loss of benefits for early retirement. 
26.5 The Bank of Italy raises the discount rate from 8.25% to 9% (75 
basis points) with effect from 29 May. The rate applied to fixed­term ad­
vances is raised from 9.75% to 10.5%. 30.5 The government approves 
the Document for Economic and Financial Planning (DPEF) and pro­
poses tough financial targets for 1996­98 with a call for a package of 
budget savings of LIT 32.5 trillion for 1996. 
31.5 The Minister for Public Works and the Environment presents ­ and 
Parliament approves ­ a Decree Law on the new rules for public works 
contracts. The Decree Law has been approved one year after the entry 
into force of the Legge Merloni, which contributed substantially to the 
sluggishness of construction investment last year. 
Luxembourg (L) 
None. 
Netherlands (NL) 
9.5 The central bank decides to cut its rate on special advances by 0.1 
percentage point, from 4.4% to 4.3%. The central rate remains un­
changed at 4%. 
30.5 The central bank decides to cut its rate on special advances by 0.1 
percentage point, from 4.3% to 4.2%. The central rate remains un­
changed at 4%. 
Portugal (P) 
None. 
Austria (A) 
16.5 The Austrian government approves its convergence programme, 
which aims to reduce the general government deficit to 3% of GDP by 
1997. 
Portugal (P) 
None, 
Finland (FIN) 
None. 
Sweden (S) 
None. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
None. 
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